The Role of Science in the Supreme Court\u27s Limitations on Juvenile Punishment by Saunders, Kevin W.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
2013
The Role of Science in the Supreme Court's
Limitations on Juvenile Punishment
Kevin W. Saunders
Michigan State University College of Law, saunde44@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin W. Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court's Limitations on Juvenile Punishment, 46 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 339 (2013).
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE SUPREME 
COURT'S LIMITATIONS ON JUVENILE 
PUNISHMENT 
Kevin W Saunders • 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 339 
II. THE STATE OF SCIENCE IN 1988 ........................................................ 340 
ill. THE COURT'S EARLY DECISIONS ...................................................... 343 
IV. LATER DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE .................................................. 34 7 
V. THE COURT'S MORE RECENT DECISIONS ......................................... 352 
VI. QUESTIONING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE ................................................ 359 
VII. CONCLUSION ....................................................... ····· ......................... 367 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1988, the United States Supreme Court has considered the propriety 
of imposing very harsh sentences, death or life without the possibility of parole, 
for offenses minors committed. 1 In a pair of cases in 1988 and 1989, the Court 
threw out a death sentence for a person who had committed murder as a fifteen-
year-old, but later refused to find the imposition of the death penalty on a 
person who committed murder as a seventeen-year-old unconstitutional.2 In a 
later series of cases, the Court reversed course and held unconstitutional the 
imposition of the death penalty or of life without the possibility of parole, at 
least as a mandatory sentence, when the crime had been committed before the 
defendant turned eighteen. 3 
There were advances in the scientific understanding of the nature of 
juveniles that might serve to explain the Court's change in position. Indeed, 
this new scientific knowledge was presented to the Court in briefs by amici in 
recent cases.4 This Article will examine the role that the scientific 
developments may or may not have played in the Court's change in position. 
* Charles Clarke Chair in Constitutional Law, Michigan State University. A.B., Franklin & Marshall 
College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan. Professor Saunders was on 
brief for the petitioner in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), discussed infra notes 37--63 and 
accompanying text. 
I. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 ( 1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). 
2. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380, abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Thompson, 
487 U.S. at 838. 
3. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 
(2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at 579. 
4. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
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First, the state of science leading into the 1988 and 1989 cases will be 
presented.5 Second, the Court's decisions in those cases will be examined.6 
Next, developments in science between the two groups of cases will be 
discussed. 7 That will be followed by a discussion of the treatment of the 
science in the opinions by the members of the Court in the later series of cases. 8 
Lastly, conclusions regarding the role of science will be offered.9 
II. THESTATEOFSCIENCEIN 1988 
At the time of the Supreme Court's ftrst considerations of the juvenile 
death penalty, there was science speaking to the development of children, 
although not of the neuroscientiftc variety that might be thought to have 
influenced the Court in the later cases. The science did not study the physical 
structure of the relevant regions of the brain, but presented conclusions based 
on examining the behavior of children and asking them questions involving 
moral decision-making. The interest had not been so much in the answers that 
came from the children, but in how they approached the problems. Even in this 
pre-neuroscience era, in the sense of applying neuroscience to the development 
of youth, there was evidence that moral development was a long-term process, a 
recognition that moral reasoning in youths and teenagers was not fully 
developed. 
Some of the early work in this area was that of Jean Pia get, perhaps better 
known for his study of the development of mathematical thinking, 10 but an 
important contributor to the fteld of moral development as well. 11 Piaget's 
study involved presenting a variety of stories to children of different ages. 12 He 
then asked them questions about the stories to examine their moral reasoning. 
All the stories involved a person who caused harm to another, with variation in 
the seriousness of the harm and the intention of the actor. 13 
Piaget found that children younger than ten focus on the consequences of 
the act; the intention of the actor is not seen as a measure of wrong or fault. 14 It 
is only how much harm occurs that determines how wrong the act is. 15 This 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. See infra Part ill. 
7. See infra Part IV. 
8. See infra Part V. 
9. See infra Part VI. 
10. See generally RICHARD W. COPELAND, HOW CHILDREN LEARN MATHEMATICS: TEACHING 
IMPLICATIONS OF PIAGET'S REsEARCH (4th ed. 1984) {demonstrating the influence of Piaget on mathematics 
education). 
11. See DANUTA BUKATKO & MARVIN W. DAEHLER, CHILD DEVELOPMENT: A TOPICAL APPROACH 
541-43 (1992) (discussing Piaget's work); JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie 
Gabain trans., 1932). 
12. See PIAGET, supra note 11, at 104. 
13. See id 
14. See BUKATKO & DAEHLER, supra note 11, at 541-42. 
15. See id 
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would seem parallel to any argument in the debate over juvenile punishment 
that rests on the serious results the actions of children may have. Its sole focus 
on consequences seems representative of this undeveloped form of moral 
reasoning. 
Piaget determined that it is only older children who consider motives and 
intentions in their moral analyses, particularly in assigning fault. 16 This can be 
seen as a sort of cognitive development because it requires an ability to 
understand motives and intentions. 17 What is clear from Piaget's work is that 
moral development is a process that takes place over a number of years and 
extends beyond the early cognitive development of infancy. 18 
The path Piaget blazed was later picked up by Lawrence Kohlberg, who 
showed that the development Piaget identified carried on into the teen years and 
young adulthood. 19 As had Piaget, Kohlberg presented his subjects with 
scenarios that raised moral issues.20 Perhaps his best-known scenario involved 
a man whose wife was dying of cancer: The local pharmacist had developed a 
drug treatment that would cure her, but was charging a price that was far in 
excess of what the man could afford and what it cost to produce the drug. 
Failing to convince the pharmacist to reduce the price or defer payment, the 
man stole the drug.Z1 
When Kohl berg asked children of various ages whether or not the husband 
should have stolen the drug, he found that the responses varied with age.Z2 It 
was not, however, the yes-or-no response that interested Kohlberg, but instead, 
it was the subjects' moral reasonings backing up their positions. While not all 
children of the same age offered the same sorts of reasons, the children did 
progress through the same stages of moral development and varieties of reason, 
even if at different rates.23 
16. See id. 
17. See infra Part N. This understanding of the motives and intentions of others differs from the 
development of judgment and inhibition in the individual, a development that occurs later in the child's life. 
Understanding that motive and intention matter is not the same as deciding whether or not to act in a 
particular way, controlling one's desires or predicting the consequences of one's actions. 
18. See PIAGET, supra note 11, at 104. 
19. See, e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, REsEARCH, AND SOCIAL IsSUES 31 (Thomas 
Lickona ed., 1976) [hereinafter Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization]; Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and 
Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION 
THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (David A. Goslin ed., 1969) [hereinafter Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence]; see 
generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NATURE AND 
VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES (1984) [hereinafter THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT). 
20. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19 (presenting essays on 
moral development, authored or co-authored by Kohlberg). 
21. See id. at 640. 
22. See id. 
23. Carol Gilligan criticized Kohlberg's stages and believed Kohlberg to have been male-centric in his 
analysis. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S 
DEVELOPMENT 18 (I 982). Gilligan identified stages of moral development in females. !d. at 64. While the 
stages may have been different, they were still present. /d. Because most of the juvenile punishment issues 
arise in cases involving male defendants, the focus in the remainder of this section will be on Kohlberg's 
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Kohlberg concluded that children progress from what he called the 
"preconventional stage" through the "conventional stage," and then to the 
postconventional stage of moral reasoning, further complicated by the 
conclusion that each stage actually has two substages. 24 In the preconventional 
stage, the child focuses solely on punishment and reward?5 In the first substage 
of the preconventional stage, the child is concerned with avoiding punishment, 
and as Piaget had found, it is the consequence of an act, rather than motive, that 
matters?6 In the second substage, the focus is on following rules when it is in 
one's interest/7 an interest that could include being rewarded, along with the 
recognition that there is more to moral judgment than simply considering the 
magnitude of an act's consequences. 28 
At the conventional stage, children recognize the existence of societal 
rules and a social order.29 Intentions, motives, and the perspectives of others 
come to play a role in moral reasoning. In the first substage, the child focuses 
on avoiding disapproval, not simply avoiding punishment or living up to what 
is expected; motives are seen as important.30 At the second substage, the focus 
changes to adhering to the rules of, and duties imposed by, the social system.31 
It is this last, fourth substage that is seen as going beyond the developmental 
stages Piaget recognized. 32 
Kohl berg did recognize a third "[p ]ost conventional, or principled" stage, 
a stage some reach as children, but are more likely to reach as young adults. 33 
At that stage, the individual understands the nature of laws and rules and 
becomes capable of rather advanced moral reasoning.34 Because this stage 
occurs at an age beyond what would be considered juvenile, it lacks relevance 
for the current analysis. 35 
stages. /d. 
24. See BUKATKO & DAEHLER, supra note II, at 544-46. 
25. See id. 
26. See Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence, supra note 19, at 379-80. 
27. See Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization, supra note 19, at 174. 
28. See Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence, supra note 19, at 379-80. 
29. Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization, supra note 19, at 174-75. 
30. /d. 
31. See id. at 175. 
32. See THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19, at xxviii. 
33. See Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization, supra note 19, at 175. 
34. See id. 
35. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Development Theory, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19, at 5. Kohlberg said that the fifth substage, the frrst of the post-(;onventionalist 
substages, would appear in the posHollege years, rather than when the individual would be considered a 
juvenile for criminal purposes, and that the sixth was more of a theoretical ideal. See id. In later work 
applying a refmement of the standards, he found that none of the individuals studied, with one possible 
exception, had reached that sixth level. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine & Alexandra Hewer, The 
Cu"ent Formulation of the Theory, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19, at 270--
74. 
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Thus, at the time of the Supreme Court's first two juvenile death penalty 
cases, there was science that could have informed the Court's decisions.36 The 
next section will consider the impact of the science on those decisions. 
III. THE COURT'S EARLY DECISIONS 
The Court first considered the imposition of the death penalty on a person 
who committed a crime as a juvenile in Thompson v. Oklahoma.31 That case 
involved a fifteen-year-old who had participated in the murder of his former 
brother-in-law, seemingly in an effort to protect the defendant's sister from 
continuing abuse.38 A plurality opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concluded that the imposition of the death 
penalty on one so young was unconstitutional. 39 The result in favor of the 
defendant-appellant required one more vote. Justice O'Connor provided that 
vote, but she was unwilling to conclude that the Constitution provided the 
protection for juveniles the plurality asserted.40 There was also a three-justice 
dissent written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice White.41 
So, what role did science play in the opinions? The plurality opinion 
seems to have drawn some guidance from the scientific understanding of 
youth.42 The plurality said the decision on the permissibility of the death 
penalty was based on whether or not children could be as culpable as adults, 
and on whether "the social purposes ... served by the death penalty" justify its 
application to those under sixteen years old at the time of their crimes.43 
With regard to culpability, the plurality noted "broad agreement on the 
proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than 
adults.'.-44 Fleshing out this general observation, the plurality went on to say: 
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition oflife 
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, 
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than 
adults.45 
36. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. 
37. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-19 {1988). 
38. See id. 
39. See id. at 818. 
40. See id. at 84~9 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
41. See id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
42. See id. at 833-35 (plurality opinion). 
43. See id. at 833. 
44. /d. at 834. 
45. /d. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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The plurality noted that harm to the victim may be just as significant when a 
crime is committed by a juvenile, but stated that juveniles "deserve less 
punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct 
and to think in long-range terms than adults. "46 Further, the plurality noted that 
blame for the failure to conform conduct to the expected is also a failure of the 
family, the schools, and the social system.47 The minor's lack of experience, 
education, and greater susceptibility to peer pressure make the child less 
culpable.48 
Turning to the purposes of the death penalty, the plurality found two 
principal purposes: retribution and deterrence.49 Retribution was not consistent 
with the "lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for 
growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children."50 Deterrence was 
equally inapplicable. 51 
The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit 
analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote 
as to be virtually nonexistent. And, even if one posits such a cold-blooded 
calculation by a 15-year-old, it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred 
by the knowledge that a small number of persons his age have been executed 
52 
Because the social purposes of capital punishment were not met, such a penalty 
was seen as a "purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. "53 
To throw out the death sentence, one more vote was needed.54 Justice 
O'Connor provided that vote, but her concurring opinion did not rest on any 
insights involving juveniles. 55 She noted that the state had two separate statutes 
that, put together, allowed the execution of minors. 56 One statute provided for 
capital punishment for murder, but did not set a minimum age.57 The other 
provided that fifteen-year-olds might, under some circumstances, be treated as 
adults. 58 As a result, she thought there was "a considerable risk that the 
Oklahoma Legislature either did not realize that its actions would have the 
effect of rendering 15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not give the 
question the serious consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit 
46. /d. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47. See id 
48. See id at 835. 
49. See id at 836. 
50. /d. at 836-37. 
51. /d. at 837. 
52. /d. at 837-38. 
53. /d. at 838 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977}}(intemal quotation marks omitted). 
54. See id at 848-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
55. See id 
56. See id at 850-52. 
57. Seeid 
58. Seeid 
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choice of some minimum age for death eligibility."59 She was not ready to 
conclude that there is anything inherently wrong with executing a person who 
was fifteen at the time of committing a murder, but concluded only that a state 
that wishes to do so must explicitly make that choice.60 
There was also a three-justice dissent written by Justice Scalia, joined by 
the Chief Justice and Justice White. They made clear their view that age is not 
a sufficient basis for vacating a death sentence. 61 The dissenters concluded that 
any question of whether the particular defendant should be so treated was 
resolved by the state criminal justice system; the jury "considered whether, 
despite his young age, his maturity and moral responsibility were sufficiently 
developed to justify the sentence of death."62 The dissent was not willing to 
rely on any conclusions regarding the development ofjuveniles.63 
The next case, Stanford v. Kentucky, was decided in the next term. 64 
While the case might be seen as a change in direction for the Court because it 
had the opposite result for the defendant than in Thompson, the Justices 
actually maintained their positions from the case a year earlier. The defendants 
in Stanford (actually two consolidated cases from Kentucky and Missouri) were 
seventeen and sixteen-year-aids, named Stanford and Wilkins, who were found 
guilty of more random murders. 65 The judgment of the Court was announced 
by Justice Scalia, whose opinion was joined in total by the other dissenters from 
Thompson, and by Justice Kennedy, who had not participated in Thompson. 66 
Justice Scalia noted that there had been a hearing on whether or not to transfer 
Stanford to adult court and that Wilkins had been certified by the juvenile court 
for trial as an adult.67 Given this individualized assessment, and failure to find 
any consensus against the juvenile death penalty, a majority ofthe Court, with 
Justice O'Connor joining on this point in Justice Scalia's opinion, upheld the 
death penalty sentences.68 
Turning to the kind of analysis that had been offered by the Thompson 
majority, the opinion by Justice Scalia, having lost Justice O'Connor's vote on 
this issue and so becoming a plurality opinion, rejected the claim that the death 
penalty for juveniles serves no legitimate purpose.69 The plurality noted "an 
array of socioscientific evidence concerning the psychological and emotional 
59. /d. at 857. 
60. See id. at 854-55. 
61. /d. at 859. 
62. /d. at 863 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
63. /d. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
64. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
65. /d. While the defendant in Thompson had killed his ex-brother-in-law in a seeming attempt to 
protect his sister, Stanford committed murder following a rape and robbery, and Wilkins, the defendant in the 
Missouri case, also killed his victim in the process of a robbery. See id. at 36~6; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 
819 (plurality opinion). 
66. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361. 
67. See id. at 365-67. 
68. See id. at 377-78. 
69. /d. at 377. 
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development of 16- and 17-year-olds."70 The plurality, however, effectively 
found the evidence irrelevant: 
If such evidence could conclusively establish the entire lack of deterrent 
effect and moral responsibility, resort to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause would be unnecessary; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would invalidate these laws for lack of rational basis. But as the 
adjective "socioscientific" suggests (and insofar as evaluation of moral 
responsibility is concerned perhaps the adjective "ethicoscientific" would be 
more apt), it is not demonstrable that no 16-year-old is "adequately 
responsible" or significantly deterred. It is rational, even if mistaken, to think 
the contrary. The battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eighth 
Amendment; and in that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even 
purely scientific evidence is not an available weapon .... We have no power 
under the Eighth Amendment to substitute our belief in the scientific evidence 
for the society's apparent skepticism.71 
While speaking of societal skepticism, it seems clear that the plurality, at least 
with regard to the psychological sort of evidence then existing, was itself 
skeptical. 
Justice O'Connor, who provided the fifth vote upholding the death penalty 
sentences, noted the difference between these cases and Thompson, in which 
she had provided the fifth vote overturning the death penalty. 72 In Thompson, 
she had noted that there was no state statute setting a minimum age for 
execution. 73 In Stanford, she said that "such specificity is not necessary to 
avoid constitutional problems if it is clear that no national consensus forbids the 
imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed at such an age."74 With 
regard to sixteen or seventeen-year-olds, she found no such national 
consensus. 75 
The four Justices who had made up the plurality in Thompson found 
themselves dissenting in Stanford. 76 Those Justices called for a more searching 
inquiry that must: 
also encompass what Justice Scalia calls, with evident but misplaced disdain, 
"ethicoscientific" evidence. Only then can we be in a position to judge, as 
our cases require, whether punishment is unconstitutionally excessive, either 
70. /d. at 377-78. 
71. /d. at 3 78 (citations omitted). 
72. See id at 38~1 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
73. /d. 
74. /d. 
75. ld at 381. 
76. Id at 382. 
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because it is disproportionate given the culpability of the offender, or because 
it serves no legitimate penal goal. 77 
The dissent seems correct in picking up on the "disdain" in the plurality's view 
of science. 78 In contrast, the dissent would have drawn guidance from those 
with expertise.79 
Where organizations with expertise in a relevant area have given careful 
consideration to the question of a punishment's appropriateness, there is no 
reason why that judgment should not be entitled to attention as an indicator of 
contemporary standards. There is no dearth of opinion from such groups that 
the state-sanctioned killing of minors is unjustified.80 
The dissent cited to amicus briefs filed primarily by public interest and religious 
organizations, as well as briefs filed by social workers and adolescent 
psychiatrists. 81 
Looking at the first two cases, then, despite the fact that the results were 
different, we find Justices sticking to their positions. Four Justices find 
scientific reasons for rejecting the juvenile death penalty.82 Four Justices reject 
the then-existing science in upholding the death penalty.83 Justice O'Connor, 
while refusing to join the Stanford plurality's rejection of science, finds a lack 
of consensus with regard to the propriety of executing those under sixteen, 
coupled with the consensus that the death penalty may be appropriate for those 
sixteen and older.84 In fairness to those who rejected science, the science, 
consisting of observational theories of moral development, might have been 
seen as lacking the strength that was soon to appear. 
IV. LATER DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE 
Neuroscience that spoke to juvenile capacity and culpability existed at the 
time ofthe earlier Supreme Court cases, but it was nowhere near as developed 
as it would come to be. Prior to these relatively recent developments, many 
believed that the growth and development of the brain was completed in early 
childhood. 85 If that was the case, there was not a physical distinction, other 
77. /d. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
78. See id. 
79. Jd. at 388. 
80. /d. 
81. See id. at 388 n.4. 
82. Compare id. at 383 (upholding the juvenile death penalty), with Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 818 (1988) (rejecting the juvenile death penalty based on expert data). 
83. Compare Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364 (majority opinion), with Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (1988) 
(rejecting the use of ethicoscientific data in order to uphold the death penalty). 
84. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 38(}-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
85. BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW DISCOVERIES ABOUT THE TEENAGE 
BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIDS 7 (2004). 
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than body size, to point to in differentiating juveniles from adults. 86 This began 
to change in the late 1970s with a study of brain tissue recovered during 
autopsies of normal individuals, ranging from infants to those in their nineties. 87 
The study examined the density of synapses88 in the middle frontal gyrus 
portion of the frontal cortex. 89 
The study found a constancy in density of those between sixteen and 
seventy-two, with a slight decline in old age.90 More interesting, particularly 
for the subject of juvenile justice, were the changes found in infancy and early 
childhood.91 Newborns were found to have a synaptic density equal to that of 
adults, but the density increased during infancy to reach a density 50% higher 
than that of adults by the time the child was two.92 Synaptic density then 
decreased between ages two to sixteen to reach the adult level.93 The study 
involved density, not simply the size of the brain.94 The brain reaches its full 
size by about age seven, but the changes in density continue; the synaptic 
density of the seven-year-old brain is still 36% higher than that of the adult 
brain.95 
A 1987 study, after the early Supreme Court cases, used positron emission 
tomography (PET) scans to measure the brain's use of glucose, a sign of brain 
activity.96 Newborns used less glucose than adults, but by age one, their 
glucose levels reached adult levels and then continued to climb to twice adult 
levels by the time a child reached the age of three or four.97 Their levels then 
remained steady until age nine, before decreasing to the adult rate between 
fifteen and twenty.98 While this difference might be interesting in itself, 
perhaps more interesting was the finding that there were regional differences in 
the brain's glucose use at different stages of development, with the 
evolutionarily older portions maturing more quickly.99 Glucose use in the brain 
86. See id. 
87. See Peter R. Huttenlocher, Synaptic Density in Human Frontal Cortex-Developmental Changes 
and Effects of Aging, 163 BRAIN REs. 195, 197 (1979). 
88. !d. at 196. Synapses are the points at which nerve cells communicate, the gaps between the dendrite 
of one neuron and the axon of another. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER PETERSON, iNTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 
56-58 (1991). Those dendrites and axons are branching extensions of neuron cell bodies that allow a sort of 
proximity among neurons whose cell bodies may be at some distance. Id Because of the proximity, the 
chemical neurotransmitter released by the axon of one neuron causes a reaction in the dendrite of the other. 
Id 
89. See Huttenlocher, supra note 87, at 196. The frontal cortex is a portion of the cortex, the most highly 
evolved part of the brain, which is located behind the forehead. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 88, at 63-M. 
90. Huttenlocher, supra note 87, at 195. 




95. ld at 202. 
96. See Harry T. Chugani et al., Positron Emission Tomography Study of Human Brain Functional 
Development, 22 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 487, 487 (1987). 
97. See id at 490. 
98. Seeid 
99. Seeid 
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stem and cerebellum was closer to the adult level at birth and in the first year, 
although within the cerebellum, the evolutionarily older portions matured 
earlier. 100 It was in the cerebral cortex that the greatest differences and changes 
were found. 101 
A paper published in the late 1990s shows the state of knowledge at that 
time. 102 It had become known that brain growth, the branching of dendrites to 
form synapses, and myelination, the insulation of nerve cells, took place first in 
the motor and sensory regions of the brain, and later in the more advanced 
prefrontal cortex. 103 The authors of the study also noted that these regional 
differences in physical development seemed to match differences in functional 
development. 104 
More complex "executive" functions of [the] prefrontal cortex such as 
reasoning, motivation, and judgment appear to develop gradually during 
childhood and adolescence, perhaps continuing during the adult years. These 
uniquely human functions appear late during development, and their 
emergence may be aided by late persistence of exuberant synapses in [the] 
prefrontal cortex. 105 
This recognition of these physical differences, particularly in the development 
of brain regions involved in judgment, and the suggestion that development 
may continue into the adult years match the conclusions of the non-neurological 
study of moral development by Kohl berg. 106 
Science in this area would receive a major boost from the development of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The use of MRis overcame 
any issues with the shortage of material from autopsies, because MRis could be 
conducted with a live subject. Furthermore, MRI studies allow for a 
longitudinal study of the same individual as the individual develops. The year 
1999 saw the publication of several significant studies based on MRis. 
Dr. Jay Giedd of the National Institute of Mental Health and his 
colleagues studied 145 healthy individuals between 4.2 and 21.6 years of age, 
with most undergoing multiple MRI scans at approximately two-year 
intervals. 107 The study showed increases in cortical gray matter in the pre-
adolescent years with a decrease in the post-adolescent years, and with peaks of 
development varying among the different regions of the cortex. 108 In another 
100. See id. at 491-93. 
101. See id. at 490. 
I 02. See Peter R. Huttenlocher & Arun S. Dabholkar, Regional Differences in Synaptogenesis in Human 
Cerebral Cortex, 387 J. COMP. NEUROLOGY 167 (1997). 
103. See id. at 167. 
I 04. See id. at 178. 
105. !d. (citation omitted). 
106. See id. 
107. See Jay N. Giedd eta!., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal 
MRl Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999). 
108. See id. 
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study published in the same journal, Professor Elizabeth Sowell and her 
colleagues found similar results in comparing MRI studies of the brains of 
adolescents and of young adults. 109 Comparing the twelve to sixteen-year-old 
group and the twenty-three to thirty-year-old age group showed significant 
differences and also noted a relation to function. 110 "In regions of [the] frontal 
cortex, we observed reduction in gray matter between adolescence and 
adulthood .... [T]he frontal lobes are essential for such functions as response 
inhibition, emotional regulation, planning and organization. Many of these 
aptitudes continue to develop between adolescence and young adulthood."111 
Another study, published the next month in the same journal, 
demonstrates the function and importance of areas still under development in 
juveniles.I 12 Professor Antonio Damasio of the University of Iowa and 
colleagues studied the behavior of two individuals who had suffered early 
physical injury to a portion of the prefrontal cortex, one as the result of an 
accident and the other as the result of a tumor. 113 The two exhibited "severely 
impaired social behavior despite normal basic cognitive abilities," were 
insensitive to the consequences of their behavior, and were not amenable to 
correction of their behavior through punishment. II4 While those who suffer 
similar injuries as adults also exhibit behavioral problems, those suffering such 
injuries in early childhood were also, unlike adults, deficient in the ability to 
reason morally. 115 The two patients, who suffered early injuries, had been left 
in the preconventional stage in Kohl berg's development of moral reasoning. 116 
"The patients demonstrated limited consideration of the social and emotional 
implications of decisions, failed to identify the primary issues involved in social 
dilemmas and generated few response options for interpersonal conflicts. "117 In 
contrast, those injured as adults were able to engage in the level of moral 
reasoning developed prior to their injuries. 118 
A 2000 overview of the science of brain development of adolescents noted 
that it is not hormones that affect teen behavior; adolescent behavior is, instead, 
caused by physical changes in the brain, and these changes occur in other 
species as well. 119 
I 09. See Elizabeth R. Sowell et a!., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal 
and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859,859 (1999). 
II 0. See id at 860. 
Ill. /d. (footnote omitted). 
112. See Steven W. Anderson eta!., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage 
in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032, 1032-33 (1999). 
113. See id. at 1032. 
114. /d. 
115. Seeid. 
116. See id. at 1033. 
117. /d. 
118. See id at 1034-35. 
119. See Linda Patia Spear, Neurobehavioral Changes in Adolescence, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN 
PSYCHOL. SCI. Ill, Ill (2000). 
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This remodeling of the brain is seen in adolescents of a variety of species and 
entails not only brain growth, including the formation of additional 
connections between nerve cells, but also a prominent loss (or pruning) of 
such connections in particular neural regions. Among the brain areas 
prominently remodeled ... is the prefrontal cortex, a brain region thought to 
be involved in various goal-directed behaviors ... and in emotional 
processing . . . . Along with a decline in the relative size of the prefrontal 
cortex during adolescence, there is substantial remodeling of connections 
between neurons-with some connections lost and others added. 120 
351 
The author concluded that, with these brain differences, it would be 
"astonishing indeed if adolescents did not differ from adults in various aspects 
of their motivated behavior."121 
By 2003, New York Times science editor Barbara Strauch's book The 
Primal Teen: What the New Discoveries About the Teenage Brain Tell Us 
About Our Kids provided a statement regarding brain development that speaks 
to behavior. 122 
Over a span of roughly ten to twelve years, the adolescent brain, through a 
series of sometimes subtle and sometimes breathtakingly dramatic shifts, is 
transformed from child to adult. The grey matter of an adolescent's frontal 
lobes grows denser and then abruptly scales back, molding a leaner thinking 
machine. The teenage brain fine-tunes its most human part, the prefrontal 
cortex, the place that helps us cast a wary eye, link cause to effect, decide 
"maybe not"-the part, in fact, that acts grown-up. 123 
The process includes the teen years, but matching the findings ofKohlberg, it 
lasts into the twenties. 124 
The impact this science should have on juveniles was also noticed in this 
now decade-old work. 125 Because one of the main tasks of the area under 
development is the inhibition of acts, and "[a] s the brain develops-in children 
and, science is now learning, in teenagers-it is this very inhibition machinery 
that is being fine-tuned. . . . [W]hat can we expect of adolescents if that 
inhibition machinery, the prefrontal cortex, is not yet fully tuned?"126 It seems 
clear that teenagers are simply not as capable as adults at inhibiting behavior. 127 
Furthermore, this less developed state of the brain makes it less likely that 
teenagers will recognize the consequences their acts may have. 128 When it 
120. See id. at 112-13. 
121. !d. at 113. 
122. STRAUCH, supra note 85, at 203--{)4. 
123. !d. 
124. See id. at 204. 
125. !d. at 32. 
126. Seeid. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 91. 
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comes to inhibition and understanding consequences, both of which are vital to 
moral reasoning, the wiring of the teenage brain is incomplete and not up to the 
task. 
V. THE COURT'S MORE RECENT DECISIONS 
By the time the Court returned to the issue of the juvenile death penalty in 
Roper v. Simmons 129 and later cases on other harsh punishments, science, with 
regard to the juvenile brain and its impact on behavior, had clearly advanced 
beyond that which was available in the earlier cases. 130 The Roper Court was 
made aware of these scientific developments in a pair of amicus briefs, one 
filed by the American Psychological Association and the Missouri 
Psychological Association, 131 and the second by the American Medical 
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Society for 
Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Academy of Child & Adolescent 
Psychiatry, the American Academy of Psychiatry & the Law, the National 
Association of Social Workers, the Missouri Chapter of the National 
Association of Social Workers, and theN ational Mental Health Association. 132 
The briefs set out the science in greater detail than is presented here. 133 The 
science should have had an impact on the Court's understanding and rulings 
and, indeed, the Court came to a different conclusion in Roper than it had in 
Stanford. 134 
The defendant in Roper was seventeen when he committed a murder after 
a burglary. 135 Under Missouri law, a seventeen-year-old charged with such a 
crime is tried as an adult. 136 The court informed the jury, in considering the 
death penalty, that it could consider the defendant's age as a mitigating factor, 
but it recommended the death penalty. 137 When the case reached the Supreme 
Court, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, found a consensus among the 
states against the juvenile death penalty and concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment required the rejection of such a penalty for juveniles. 138 
The Court noted three differences between juveniles and adults that 
demonstrate that juveniles cannot be considered to be among the worst 
129. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005). 
130. See id. at 569. 
131. See Brief for American Psychological Ass'n & the Missouri Psychological Ass 'n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447. 
132. See Brieffor American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549. 
133. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
134. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
135. See id. at 556. 
136. !d. at 557. 
137. !d. at 558. 
138. See id. at 564--{)8. 
2013] THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN JUVENILE PUNISHMENT 353 
offenders-those subject to the death penalty. 139 First, a lack of maturity and 
the less-developed sense of responsibility lead to action decisions that are 
impetuous and ill-considered.140 Juveniles are less in control of their own 
environments and more vulnerable to negative influences and peer pressure. 141 
And, "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The 
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed."142 This last factor 
appeared to be particularly relevant. 143 The Court said: 
The reality that juveniles still struggle to defme their identity means it is less 
supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is 
evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it 
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, 
for greatefJossibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be 
reformed. 
Having recognized diminished culpability, the Court found the 
justifications offered for the death penalty did not apply as strongly to juveniles 
as adults. 145 Lesser culpability, because of the factors noted, means that 
retribution is not appropriate. 146 Furthermore, the same factors that make 
juveniles less culpable make them less likely to be deterred by the possibility of 
a death sentence. 147 
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion. 148 She found the evidence of 
a consensus against the juvenile death penalty lacking, reflecting the position 
she had taken in Stanford. 149 She did not completely discount the fact that 
juveniles are generally less culpable than adults, but said that did not mean that 
every seventeen-year-old was insufficiently culpable to merit the death 
penalty. 150 Rather than drawing a line fixed on the basis of age, she concluded 
that individualized assessment by juries considering age as a mitigating factor 
was adequate to single out those juveniles to be subjected to the death 
penalty. 151 
139. See id. at 569. 
140. See id. 
141. !d. 
142. !d. at 570 (citing E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1958)). 
143. !d. 
144. !d. 
145. !d. at 571. 
146. !d. 
147. !d. The Court noted the rule preventing psychiatrists from diagnosing patients under eighteen as 
having antisocial personality disorder because of the difficulty in determining which rare juvenile offenders 
might be irreparably corrupt. See id. at 573. 
148. !d. at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
149. Id. at 588. 
150. See id. at 59~00. 
151. See id. at 606. 
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Justice Scalia also wrote a dissent, in which he was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 152 Justice Scalia, like Justice O'Connor, saw no 
evidence of a consensus against the juvenile death penalty. 153 In his view, "the 
real force driving today's decision is ... the Court's own judgment that 
murderers younger than 18 can never be as morally culpable as older 
counterparts. "154 But, of course, it was not solely the Court's own judgment of 
morality. 155 There was a moral dimension to the majority's opinion, but it was 
a science-driven conclusion. 156 Justice Scalia's disdain for science, or at least 
the majority's use of science, was also evident. 157 "To support its opinion ... 
the Court looks to scientific and sociological studies, picking and choosing 
those that support its position. It never explains why those particular studies 
are methodologically sound; none was ever entered into evidence or tested in an 
adversarial proceeding."158 The peer review of academic journals seems to 
have been inadequate as a test of the evidence. 159 He went on to say that the 
nuances of scientific methodology and conflicts among scientific studies made 
the courts "ill equipped to determine which view of science is the right one."160 
It is true that judges and justices tend not to be scientific experts, but this is also 
true of members of the legislature, a group that Justice Scalia thought better 
qualified. 161 In fact, neither group has any expertise; the only expertise in the 
case was that shared by the scientific health organizations in their amicus 
briefs. 162 
Justice Scalia, after denying any expertise on the part of courts, went on to 
evaluate the science. 163 He found the studies to be lacking in support of the 
majority's position. 164 In his view, the studies, at most, concluded that the 
average person of eighteen is unable to take moral responsibility. 165 He found it 
consistent with the studies "to believe that those who commit premeditated 
murder are-at least sometimes-just as culpable as adults."166 
152. Id at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
153. See id. at 609-10. 
154. !d. at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
155. See id. at 569 (majority opinion). 
156. See id. at 569-71. 
157. See id. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
158. Id at 616-17. Justice Scalia does offer one interesting contradiction in the positions taken by the 
American Psychological Association. See id. at 617-18. The Association had taken the position in its amicus 
brief that those under eighteen are not morally responsible, but in Hodgson v. Minnesota, a case involving 
juveniles and abortion, the Association had argued that even juveniles as young as fourteen are as capable as 
adults with regard to moral reasoning. See id. 
159. Peer Review, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, http://www.apaorglresearch/responsible/peer/(last visited Oct. 
II, 2013). 
160. Roper, 543 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
161. See id. 
162. Seeid. at617. 
163. Seeid at618-19. 
164. Seeid. at618. 
165. !d. 
166. Id 
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Five years later, the issue of juvenile punishment was again before the 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida. 167 This time the issue was not capital 
punishment, but the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole for a minor who had committed a number of armed burglaries or 
robberies. 168 The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.169 Justice Kennedy looked 
for a national consensus on such severe penalties for juveniles, and while he 
recognized that the law in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia 
allowed sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles under 
some circumstances, the failure to actually impose such sentences indicated a 
consensus against their use. 170 
In terms of using the science, the majority repeated some of the analysis 
from Roper. 111 There was no recent data speaking against the Court's earlier 
position. 172 In fact, the Court cited to amicus briefs submitted by the American 
Medical Association and the American Psychological Association in noting that 
"developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain 
involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence."173 
As had the Court in Roper, the Court found this harsh sentence unsupported by 
penological purposes, with retribution inappropriate given the lesser culpability 
of youth, and deterrence unlikely to have an impact. 174 The majority also 
considered incapacitation, but said that permanent incapacitation is justified 
only on the assumption that the juvenile is incorrigible-a conclusion 
inconsistent with youth. 175 Furthermore, rehabilitation made no sense as a goal 
for this penalty. 176 Perhaps recognizing the criticism that the scientific 
conclusion might not apply to all juveniles, the majority felt that lower courts 
would be unable to accurately identify the few juveniles who might be 
incorrigible. 177 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence, but it was only in the 
judgment. 178 He saw the combination of the defendant's juvenile status, the 
nature of the crime, and the severity of the punishment as making the sentence 
unconstitutional. 179 He would not accept, however, a categorical rule against 
167. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,2017-18 (2010). 
168. See id. at 2020. 
169. /d.at2017. 
170. See id. at 2023. 
171. See id. at 2026. 
172. See id. 
173. !d. 
174. See id. at 2028. 
175. See id. at 2029. 
176. See id. at 2029-30. 
177. See id. at 2032. 
178. ld. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
179. See id. at 2042. 
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sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole. 180 Roper was 
different, because death is different. 181 Despite the rejection of the categorical 
rule, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that age may be relevant to the propriety 
of the sentence imposed and conducted his own analysis of the defendant and 
the crime.182 He found "no reason to believe that Graham should be denied the 
general presumption of diminished culpability that Roper indicates should 
apply to juvenile offenders."183 So, Justice Roberts did not accept that the 
science demonstrates that juveniles are never sufficiently culpable, and the 
penological purposes of severe sentences for juveniles are so unmet as to justify 
life without the possibility of parole, but he did seem to accept a science-based 
presumption against such severe punishment. 184 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and in part by Justice Alito, 
dissented. 185 The part of the dissent joined by Justice Alito came to a different 
conclusion with regard to the relevance of the science.186 Justice Thomas said 
that even if"generalizations [regarding maturation and the likelihood of risky 
behavior in juveniles] from social science were relevant to constitutional 
rulemaking, the Court misstates the data on which it relies."187 There are two 
interesting points regarding this criticism. First, the dissent rejected the "social 
science" on which the Roper majority and the majority here relied. 188 The brain 
science was not mentioned in this criticism.189 
The only specific example of a misstatement of the data was a reference to 
an article cited in the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychological 
Association. 190 The dissent said that this "research relied upon by the amici 
cited in the Court's opinion differentiates between adolescents for whom 
antisocial behavior is a fleeting symptom and those for whom it is a lifelong 
pattern. That research further suggests that the pattern of behavior in the latter 
group often sets in before 18."191 
This example from the dissent points to a tactic generally available to 
diminish the impact of science. 192 It is very seldom that any scientific 
conclusion, however strongly accepted by the scientific community, will not 
180. Seeid 
181. See id at 2038-39. 
182. See id at 2040. 
183. /d. 
184. Seeid 
185. /d. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 




190. See id at 2054-55. 
191. /d. (citations omitted) (citing Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent 
Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REv. 674, 678 (1993)). The dissent noted 
that the article distinguished between those adolescents who were antisocial only while adolescents and a 
smaller group who were antisocial throughout their lifetimes. Id 
192. See id 
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have some detractors. An opponent of the conclusion toward which the science 
leads will then have an opportunity to point to "doubt" and to reject that 
conclusion. The dissent's use of the tactic here is a particularly egregious 
example. The dissent managed to find one, among the more than fifty scientific 
sources cited in the American Psychological Association's (AP A) brief, 193 that 
it thought to be contrary to the position of the majority and the AP A. 194 The 
study was an older 1993 paper, published well before the real advent of 
modem neuroscience. 195 Even if it had been directly contrary to the AP A 
position, it could have been seen as old science. But it was not even directly 
contrary. 196 There are clearly adolescents who are not only antisocial in 
adolescence but will continue in their antisocial behavior. 197 What is true for 
adolescents is that there is plasticity to their brains. 198 They are in a period of 
development. 199 Some may develop into good citizens; others may develop into 
lifelong criminals.200 All the majority and the APA needed to assert was that 
not all adolescents guilty of even major crimes are hopelessly lost.201 The 
plasticity of their brains requires that one recognize the possibility of positive 
development, a possibility that seems inconsistent with a willingness to 
sentence the juvenile to life without possibility ofparole.202 
There is one more recent case in this line. 203 The earlier cases concluded 
that juveniles could not be sentenced to death for homicide and that they could 
not be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for non-
homicide crimes. 204 What remained was the consideration of whether a 
juvenile could face a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole for homicide?05 That was the subject matter of Miller v. A/abama/06 
and the Court concluded that this severe punishment, with its implication that 
there was no hope for rehabilitation, was inappropriate even for a homicide 
committed by a juvenile. 207 
193. See Brief for American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778 at *iii-*xi 
[hereinafter Brief for American Psychological Ass 'n, Graham]. 
194. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054-55 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
195. Moffitt, supra note 191, at 674. 
196. See Brief for American Psychological Ass'n, Graham, supra note 193, at 20. 
197. See Moffitt, supra note 19l,at674. 
198. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-72 (2005). 
199. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27. 
200. See Moffitt, supra note 191, at 678-79. 
201. See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27; Brief for American Psychological Ass'n, Graham, 
supra note 193, at 4. 
202. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
203. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2012). 
204. See id. at 2463. 
205. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. There remains one additional consideration: Whether a 
juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for homicide on a discretionary basis. That 
issue did not go unnoticed by the dissenters. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2489-90 
(Alita, J., dissenting). 
206. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455 (majority opinion). 
207. See id. at 2465. 
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The case did not really break any new ground, and the distribution of votes 
in the Court was the same as in the prior case, with two exceptions.208 Justice 
Stevens had been replaced by Justice Kagan, who took a similar position, 
recognizing a difference between juveniles and adults?09 Chief Justice Roberts 
had sided with the majority in overturning the sentence in Graham, but it had 
more to do with the specifics of that case.210 In Miller, the Chief Justice wrote a 
dissenting opinion. 211 
Miller was a consolidation of two appeals, one of which involved a 
fourteen-year-old who participated in a robbery in which his co-felon killed a 
store clerk.212 While the prosecutor had had the discretion whether or not to 
charge the juvenile as an adult, subsequently having been convicted as an adult, 
life without the possibility of parole was the only available sentence.213 The 
case also involved a fourteen-year-old, who had killed a victim in the process of 
another robbery. 214 The state juvenile court sent the case to adult court, and the 
juvenile received a mandatory sentence oflife without parole.215 
The Supreme Court declared the sentences unconstitutional in an opinion 
written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor.216 The majority covered much of the same ground as had the 
Roper and Graham majorities, noting diminished culpability and a greater 
likelihood of reform and basing its position on the same science cited in the 
earlier cases.217 In fact, the majority saw its position as even more scientifically 
justified than in the prior cases?18 "The evidence presented to us in these cases 
indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper's and Graham's 
conclusions have become even stronger."219 
If the majority was reinforced in its views by the science, the science did 
not sway the dissenters.220 Chief Justice Roberts, in a dissent joined by Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, first found no consensus against such juvenile 
208. /d. at 2460. 
209. /d. at 2464. 
210. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010)(Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
211. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
212. /d. at 2460-61 (majority opinion). 
213. /d. at 2461. 
214. /d. at 2462. 
215. /d. at 2462-63. 
216. Seeid.at2460. 
217. See id. at 2464. 
218. See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
219. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5. The footnote cited the Brief of the American Psychological 
Association as stating "[A]n ever-growing body of research in developmental psychology and neuroscience 
continues to confmn and strengthen the Court's conclusions." /d. (quoting Brief for American Psychological 
Ass'n, Graham, supra note 193, at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the majority quoted 
the same brief: "It is increasingly clear that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems 
related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance." /d. 
(quoting Brief for American Psychological Ass'n, Graham, supra note 193, at 4) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
220. See id. at 2477-78 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
2013] THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN JUVENILE PUNISHMENT 359 
sentences221 and said that the issue should be left to legislatures.222 Chief 
Justice Roberts also complained that some of the reasoning in Roper was based 
on a view that the death penalty was not needed because of the availability of a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole. 223 
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice Scalia. 224 
He argued that the majority opinion was out of line with the original intent 
behind the Eighth Amendment. 225 He also expressed concern that the majority 
opinion was a step toward the elimination of discretionary sentences of life 
without the possibility ofparole.226 Lastly, Justice Alito, also joined by Justice 
Scalia, dissented. 227 He, too, found no constitutional basis for the decision228 
and expressed his own concern regarding discretionary sentencing.229 While 
the dissents did not attack the science in the way they had in the earlier cases, it 
is clear that they had not been won over by what the majority saw as scientific 
conclusions that had been strengthened. 230 
VI. QUESTIONING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE 
The issue that remains to be examined is whether or not science played a 
role in what appears to be a change in the Court's view with regard to juvenile 
sentencing. The greater scientific understanding of the nature of juveniles 
developed in the era between Stanford and Roper. 231 That was also the time 
span in which the Court could be seen as shifting its views on juvenile 
punishment. It is true that Thompson and Stanford reached different results 
regarding the juvenile death penalty, but this should not be seen as signaling 
any earlier change in the view of juveniles. Justices Stevens, Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun voted against the death penalty in both cases, while 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia voted to uphold the 
sentence in both cases.232 Justice Kennedy, who had not participated in 
Thompson, voted to uphold the death penalty in Stanford.233 The fifth vote 
voiding the death penalty in Thompson was Justice O'Connor, who voted to 
uphold the death penalty in Stanford. 234 The difference for her was that in the 
221. See id. at 2478. 
222. See id. at 2480. 
223. !d. at2481. 
224. !d. at 2482 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
225. !d. 
226. See id. at 2486. 
227. !d. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
228. See id. 
229. See id. at 2489-90. 
230. See id. at 2477-83 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), 2483-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2487-90 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
231. See supra notes 64, 129 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 40, 68 and accompanying text. 
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earlier case, the sentence was not based on a specific judgment by the 
legislature that such penalties were appropriate, while in the latter case that 
judgment was present. 
Given Justice O'Connor's position, she should be included among those 
who saw no constitutional problem with the death penalty being imposed on 
juveniles if the legislatures so desired. There was, then, up through Stanford a 
majority of the Court that would not disallow even the death penalty for 
juveniles. After the Stanford to Roper era, the era in which the science 
developed, there was a majority willing to conclude that the death penalty for 
juveniles, life without the possibility of parole for non-homicide crimes by 
juveniles, and mandatory life without the possibility of parole sentences even 
for homicides by juveniles were unconstitutional. At first blush, then, it would 
appear that the science made a difference, but that conclusion may be 
questionable. 
Confirming or disconfirming this conclusion would be aided by an 
examination of the succession of votes coming out of the nine seats on the 
Court. The following chart shows the breakdown of those votes in the five 
relevant cases. The column indicating the Justices' names contains those 
Justices involved in Thompson and, where applicable, the succession ofJustices 
in that particular seat. The other entries indicate whether or not the Justice 
voted in favor of the juvenile or to uphold the punishment, with the exception 
of Justice Kennedy in Thompson, in which he did not participate. The order in 
which the Justices are presented is intended to simplify the discussion and 
should have no impact on the conclusion. 
Justice Thompson Stanford Roper Graham Miller 
Scalia Punishment Punishment Punishment Punishment Punishment 
Marshall Juvenile Juvenile 
Thomas Punishment Punishment Punishment 
O'Connor Mixed Punishment Punishment 
Ali to Punishment Punishment 
Rehnquist Punishment Punishment Punishment Spec. 
Roberts juvenile Punishment 
Stevens Juvenile Juvenile Juvenile Juvenile 
Kagan Juvenile 
Brennan Juvenile Juvenile 
Souter Juvenile 
Sotomayor Juvenile Juvenile 
Blackmun Juvenile Juvenile 
Breyer Juvenile Juvenile Juvenile 
White Punishment Punishment 
Ginsberg Juvenile Juvenile Juvenile 
Kennedy Did not Punishment Juvenile Juvenile Juvenile 
participate 
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Some insight into the Justices' votes might also be drawn from a 
consideration of two other cases-Gonzales v. Carhart and Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n. Neither case considered the issue of juvenile 
sentencing, but both turned on the acceptance or rejection of the views of the 
scientific community.235 The first, Gonzales v. Carhart, involved a federal ban 
on abortions by dilation and extraction or, as known politically, "partial birth 
abortions."236 The Court upheld the ban, despite claims that other methods of 
abortion were not as safe.237 In Justice Kennedy's opinion-joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ali to-the Court decided that 
there was a "documented medical disagreement whether the Act's prohibition 
would ever impose significant health risks on women. "238 Given what it saw as 
disagreement, the Court deferred to Congress.239 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent-joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer-had a different view of the science, noting that the Court's decision 
"tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure 
found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists."240 The dissent further concluded that, 
because Congress had relied on the testimony of a small number of physicians 
who had little to no experience with surgical abortions, or even any kind of 
abortions, "[t]he congressional findings on which the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act rests do not withstand inspection."241 Carhart, then, represents 
another case in which some members of the Court were able to find a small 
number of dissenting "scientific" voices on which to rest their conclusion. 242 
The opinion of the scientific community ran counter to that view, but the 
majority was willing to ignore that expertise.243 
The second case is Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n, which held 
California's ban on the distribution of violent videogames to minors 
unconstitutional. 244 Despite the existence of a significant body of scientific 
evidence on the harmful effects of these games on children, the majority, in an 
opinion written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, refused to credit that science.245 The majority noted 
that the lower courts had rejected the science, and expressed approval of that 
rejection. 246 
235. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 181 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124(2007). 
236. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 132, 136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
237. See id. at 132, 162. 
238. See id. at 162. 
239. See id. at 162--63 ("The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass 
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty."). 
240. Jd. at 170-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
241. Id. at 174-75. 
242. See id. at 167--68 (majority opinion). 
243. See id. at 174-75 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
244. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,2738 (2011). 
245. See id. at 2739. 
246. See id. 
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Justice Alito's opinion-joined by Chief Justice Roberts--concurred in 
the judgment because they saw the statute as too vague, but they did not reject 
the science. 247 
When all ofthe characteristics of video games are taken into account, there is 
certainly a reasonable basis for thinking that the experience of playing a video 
game may be quite different from the experience of reading a book, listening 
to a radio broadcast, or viewing a movie. And if this is so, then for at least 
some minors, the effects of playing violent video games may also be quite 
different. The Court acts prematurely in dismissing this possibility out of 
hand.Z48 
There were also two dissents. The first, by Justice Thomas, did not really 
take on the scientific question.249 Rather, Justice Thomas relied on the views of 
the Framers regarding children's access to media.250 He would have upheld the 
statute because "[t]he practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish 
that 'the freedom of speech,' as originally understood, does not include a right 
to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going through 
the minors' parents or guardians."251 
The only Justice to actually give a careful examination to the science was 
Justice Breyer.252 In his dissent, he provided two appendices, the first listing 
115 studies supporting the concerns that motivated the California legislature, 
and the second listing thirty-four that might be seen as conflicting.253 While 
Justice Breyer admitted to lacking the expertise to say with certainty which 
body of evidence was correct, he noted that "associations of public health 
professionals who do possess that expertise have reviewed many of these 
studies and found a significant risk that violent video games, when compared 
with more passive media, are particularly likely to cause children harm."254 He 
followed up by quoting statements of concern offered by "the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child & Adolescent 
Psychiatry, the American Psychological Association, the American Medical 
Association, the American Academy of Family Physicians and the American 
Psychiatric Association. "255 
247. /d. at 2748 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
248. /d. at 2751. 
249. /d. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
250. Seeid 
251. /d. 
252. See id at 2778 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
253. See id app. at 2778-79. Not all of the studies in the second appendix really conflicted with those in 
the first. For example, a study that shows that violence in video games improves performance in those games 
does not refute the claim that the games have a negative impact in the real world. See Wolfgang Biische, 
Violent Content Enhances Video Game Performance, 21 J. MEDIA PSYCHOL.: THEORIES, METHODS, AND 
APPLICATIONS 145, 149 (2009). 
254. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
255. /d. 
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Brown also provides, then, an instance in which some of the Court's 
members seemed willing to ignore the views of the scientific community. 256 
Others, most notably Justice Breyer, but also Justice Alito and Chief Justice 
Roberts, drew guidance from those with scientific expertise. 257 The positions 
taken in both Brown and Carhart may help explain whether it was truly science 
that led to the positions of particular Justices in the juvenile sentencing cases 
and the overall change in the Court's position.258 
Turning first to the seat occupied by Justice Scalia, it is the easiest to 
analyze. Justice Scalia has held the seat for the entirety of the relevant period, 
so any change in vote would not be the result of change in the occupant. 259 
Furthermore, there has been no change in vote. 260 Justice Scalia has voted 
contrary to the science in all of the juvenile sentencing cases.Z61 He did so 
when the only available scientific work was that of developmental 
psychologists/62 and he continued after the development of neuroscientific 
evidence.Z63 In the other two cases considered, Brown and Carhart, he also 
voted against the direction indicated by the relevant sciences.Z64 Justice Scalia 
seems simply to be unaccepting of science as providing guidance to the Court. 
He is guided by his constitutional views, unencumbered by science, and that 
seems to be so whether he is upholding the legislative determination, as in the 
sentencing cases and Carhart, or striking down the legislative determination, as 
in Brown.265 Science does not matter, and perhaps he should simply say so, 
rather than trying to explain away the science. 
With regard to the seat occupied by Justice Marshall--currently occupied 
by Justice Thomas-we do find a change in votes that matches the change in 
personnel. Justice Marshall voted to strike down the death penalty in both of 
the early juvenile cases, while Justice Thomas consistently voted to uphold the 
penalties.266 Justice Marshall joined the plurality opinion in Thompson, which 
recognized differences between juveniles and adults.267 He joined the dissent in 
Stanford, which criticized the majority's "disdain" for science.268 Justice 
Marshall could, thus, be seen as relying on science. Yet, even without the 
256. See id. at 2739 (majority opinion). 
257. See id. at 2748 (Alito, 1., dissenting). 
258. See id. at 2729 (majority opinion); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124 (2007). 
259. See supra notes 39,45-46, 100-03, 113-14 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 39, 45-46 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 100-03, 113-14 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra notes 131-35, 138-39 and accompanying text. 
265. See e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,2738-39 (2011); Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 u.s. 124, 124 (2007). 
266. See e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738-39; Carhart, 550 U.S. at 124. 
267. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. 
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science, he might well come to the same conclusions simply based on his 
disagreement with the death penalty.269 
Once Justice Thomas replaced Justice Marshall, the vote from that seat 
changed.270 The change was in a direction opposite to the development of 
science; that is, while the science was providing better justification for 
distinguishing between juveniles and adults and for barring harsh sentences for 
juveniles, the vote from this seat changed from protecting juveniles to allowing 
harsh sentences.271 Such a change is one made despite the science, rather than 
because of it. 
The seat held by Justice O'Connor and then by Justice Alito can be 
viewed as providing a consistent vote in favor of allowing the legislature to 
impose harsh sentencing on juvenile offenders. Justice O'Connor did provide 
the necessary fifth vote in overturning the death penalty in Thompson, but she 
did so because the legislature had not determined that it was an acceptable 
penalty.272 In Stanford, where there was a legislative provision for the death 
penalty, she voted to uphold it.273 Justice O'Connor was still on the Court 
when it decided Roper, after the development of neuroscience. 274 She 
dissented, and while she may not have completely discounted the scientific 
conclusions, she certainly cannot be said to have been swayed by them.275 
Justice Alito joined the Court prior to Graham. He took up Justice O'Connor's 
dissenting position, but with a firmer rejection of the science.276 This was 
interesting, given Justice Alito's somewhat positive treatment of the science in 
Brown.277 Justice Alito's treatment of the science may simply indicate his 
willingness to place limits on expression, rather than indicate that he is truly 
guided by science.278 Hence, with votes consistently contrary to the direction 
that neuroscience would indicate, science cannot be said to have affected the 
vote. 
Turning to the Chief Justices, we find Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to 
uphold the imposition of the death penalty in all three of the juvenile death 
penalty cases. 279 Chief Justice Roberts might, after his vote in Graham, have 
been seen as taking the side indicated by science. 280 But it seems his 
269. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Bowers, 501 U.S. 1282, 1282 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)("[T]he death 
penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments .... "). 
270. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. 
272. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra notes 187--89 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
278. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (casting the sole 
dissenting vote in a case striking down a statute prohibiting depictions involving animal cruelty). 
279. See supra notes 62-63, 154-58 and accompanying text. 
280. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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concurrence in Graham really did rely on a combination of not only juvenile 
status, but also the crime's nature relative to the severity of the sentence.281 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected any flat rule against life without the possibility of 
parole in other juvenile cases.282 When Miller came along, with its more 
significant crime, Chief Justice Roberts voted to uphold the sentence, clearly 
indicating that neuroscience alone had not led to his earlier vote.283 
The only seat on the Court to be occupied by three Justices over the 
relevant period is that occupied by Justice Brennan, followed by Justice Souter, 
and then by Justice Sotomayor. The three consistently voted in favor of 
leniency in juvenile sentencing, but the role of neuroscience may be 
questionable. Justice Brennan's two votes occurred prior to neuroscientific 
development and probably reflect his general views on the death penalty, but 
even his views might have been strengthened by the positions taken by the 
plurality in Thompson and the dissent in Stanford.284 By the time the Court 
reached its decision in Roper, Justice Souter had replaced Justice Brennan.285 
Justice Souter joined the majority in Roper, which did seem to rely on the 
neuroscientific evidence presented to the Court.286 He may have been swayed 
by science, or he may simply have taken a liberal position. In either case, there 
was not a change in vote on the issue. When Justice Souter was replaced by 
Justice Sotomayor, she too joined the majority, which seemed guided by 
science.287 It may, however, have been more a matter of joining in a liberal 
decision, rather than a science-based decision. That conclusion would be 
consistent with Justice Sotomayor's position in Brown, in which she would not 
allow science to override the First Amendment.288 
The seat occupied by Justice Blackmun, and then Justice Breyer, provided 
a consistent vote limiting harsh juvenile sentences. The change in occupant 
occurred in the same time span as the development of neuroscience. In fact, the 
best case for science guiding a Justice would be Justice Breyer. He joined the 
majority in Roper, Graham, and Miller, 289 and all three majority opinions cited 
to neuroscientific findings. That, in itself, might be insufficient to show his 
reliance on science. But his strong reliance on science in Brown backs up the 
contention that science, rather than simply a liberal position, guided his 
decisions.290 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer's votes were the same as those cast by 
281. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text. 
284. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he death 
penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments."). 
285. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 138, 168-70, 206-12 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Blackmun, so his acceptance of science did not lead to a change in the 
Court's view?91 
Perhaps the most dramatic shift on the Court occurred when Justice White, 
who voted to uphold the death penalty in both Thompson and Stanford, was 
replaced by Justice Ginsburg.292 Justice Ginsburg became a consistent vote 
against harsh sentences for juvenile offenders.293 The change, again, occurred 
at the same time as the neuroscience evidence developed, so there was the 
possibility that Justice Ginsburg was guided by science, rather than by a more 
liberal position than Justice White would have accepted. This view might be 
backed up by Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Carhart, in which she criticized the 
majority for ignoring the scientific positions taken by the American College of 
Obstetrics & Gynecology. 294 However, she did the same in Brown by rejecting 
the science on the impact of violent videogames on children.295 The better 
explanation for Justice Ginsburg's vote, a vote that was important in the 
Court's change in position, would simply be adherence to a liberal point of 
view that protected juveniles against harsh sentences, free expression rights, 
and abortion rights. That was consistent, while her acceptance of science was 
inconsistent. 
Finally, Justice Kennedy, who has been on the Court for the entirety of the 
relevant period, may be the most difficult to explain. While Justice Kennedy 
did not participate in Thompson, he voted to uphold the death penalty in 
Stanford.296 But, at least after, if not because of, the neuroscientific 
developments, his became a consistent vote against harsh juvenile sentences. 297 
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Roper, which set out and relied 
on these neuroscientific developments,298 and he was in the majority in Graham 
and Miller,299 which built on Roper and its neuroscience. However, he also 
wrote the majority opinion in Carhart and joined the majority in Brown/00 
decisions that both cut against the views of the relevant scientific communities. 
Justice Kennedy's change in vote, then, is mysterious. If he had been 
consistent, he might be seen as taking liberal positions regarding harsh 
sentencing and free expression of rights, while not favoring abortion rights. 
But this does not explain the inconsistency in voting to uphold the death 
penalty in Stanford, while voting as he did in the later cases.301 
291. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 40, 65-66 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra notes 168-70,215-19, 138 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. 
295. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 138-44, 168-70, 206-12 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 168-70, 206-12 and accompanying text. 
300. See supra notes 238, 245 and accompanying text. 
30 I. See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
While the position taken by the Supreme Court with regard to harsh 
juvenile sentencing clearly changed during the time span in which neuroscience 
came to understand the teenage brain, it is far from clear that this change was 
motivated by new scientific understanding. In that period, the position favoring 
leniency lost one vote when Justice Marshall was replaced by Justice 
Thomas. 302 A shift of two votes in the opposite direction was then required to 
reach the Court's later position.303 Other votes in favor of the juvenile had to 
remain the same, even if the Court's personnel changed. Science could have 
played a role in the maintenance of some of those votes, but it seems not to 
have. Of the two votes that shifted, the change that resulted from Justice White 
being replaced by Justice Ginsburg seems better explained by the replacement 
of a conservative by a liberal than by the influence of science. The explanation 
for the change in Justice Kennedy's vote is far from apparent. However, even 
if science did play a role, that role in this one change of vote is insufficient to 
explain the Court's change in position. 
302. See supra notes 66, 13~, 168-70, 206-12, 238, 243 and accompanying text. 
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